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Abstract
Psychosocial assistance in emergencies plays an important
role in alleviating suffering and promoting well-being, but
it is often a source of unintended harm. A prerequisite for
ethically appropriate support is awareness of how psy-
chosocial programs may cause harm. This paper under-
scores the importance of attending to issues of
coordination, dependency, politicization of aid, assess-
ment, short-term assistance, imposition of outsider ap-
proaches, protection, and impact evaluation. With regard
to each of these issues, it suggests practical steps that may
be taken to reduce harm and maximize the humanitarian
value of psychosocial assistance.
Résumé
L’assistance psychosociale dans des situations d’urgences
joue un rôle important dans le soulagement de la souf-
france et la promotion du bien-être ; mais, souvent, elle
est la source de préjudices non intentionnels. Une con-
naissance de la façon dont les programmes psychosociaux
peuvent causer des préjudices est un préalable pour un
support éthiquement convenable. Cet article souligne
l’importance de la prise en considération des problèmes
liés à la coordination, la dépendance, la politisation de
l’aide, l’évaluation, l’assistance à court terme, l’imposi-
tion des approches par des personnes extérieures, la pro-
tection, et l’évaluation de l’impact. Il suggère des mesures
pratiques qui peuvent être prises par rapport à chacun de
ces problèmes pour réduire les préjudices et optimiser la
valeur humanitaire de l’assistance psychosociale.L’assis-
tance psychosociale dans des situations d’urgences joue
un rôle important dans le soulagement de la souffrance et
la promotion du bien-être ; mais, souvent, elle est la
source de préjudices non intentionnels. Une connaissance
de la façon dont les programmes psychosociaux peuvent
causer des préjudices est un préalable pour un support
éthiquement convenable. Cet article souligne l’impor-
tance de la prise en considération des problèmes liés à la
coordination, la dépendance, la politisation de l’aide,
l’évaluation, l’assistance à court terme, l’imposition des
approches par des personnes extérieures, la protection, et
l’évaluation de l’impact. Il suggère des mesures pratiques
qui peuvent être prises par rapport à chacun de ces pro-
blèmes pour réduire les préjudices et optimiser la valeur
humanitaire de l’assistance psychosociale.
F
or many years, psychosocial support to refugees and
internally displaced people was viewed through the
lens of Maslowian psychology1 as a second-tier opera-
tion, something to be done after one had met people’s basic
survival needs in an emergency. More than any other single
event, the December 2004 tsunami showed that the psy-
chosocial effects of catastrophic events are not secondary but
primary dimensions of the lived experience of emergencies.
For a child who had hoped for a good life but who in a matter
of minutes lost her home, family, village, belongings, and
many friends, the psychosocial shocks were not secondary
to her material losses or things to be dealt with later. This
brief but catastrophic moment convinced the world that
psychosocial support ought to occur at the same time one
applies the most immediate life-saving measures in areas
such as health, water and sanitation, shelter, and food aid.
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This increased priority of psychosocial interventions is
owed in part to the professionalization of the field of psy-
chosocial assistance to displaced people. This trend is evi-
dent in three  respects. First,  there is a rapidly growing
literature on the psychosocial impact of forced migration
that spans multiple continents, age groups, and kinds of
vulnerability and that increasingly takes into account issues
of gender, class, and culture.2 Second is an expanding array
of promising practices in supporting displaced people3 and
increased attention to the importance of documenting the
impact of psychosocial programs.4 Third is the develop-
ment of global, inter-agency guidance regarding psychoso-
cial support. Following a mandate from the Inter-Agency
Standing Committee (IASC), twenty-seven UN agencies
and consortia of non-governmental agencies (NGOs) have
recently constructed the first global guidance on the mini-
mum response to mental health and psychosocial support
needs in emergency settings.5 This guidance simultaneously
points practitioners in the directions that have proven most
effective and cautions against harmful practices.
Despite the increased professionalization and legitimacy
of the field of psychosocial assistance to displaced people,
there are significant, ongoing concerns about respect for the
humanitarian imperative “Do No Harm.” In nearly every
emergency, unnecessary harm is caused by the very hu-
manitarian operations that are intended to support affected
people.6 One of the main factors that enables harm is the
paucity of systemic evidence regarding which psychosocial
interventions work or are most effective per dollar of in-
vestment. Although the field of psychosocial assistance
shows increasing professionalization, it does not have the
impressive array of proven interventions visible in humani-
tarian sectors such as health. In the absence of hard evi-
dence, psychosocial interventions are often guided by
preconceptions, personal preferences, and ideologies
rather than by applied science that takes into account the
unique historical, political, cultural, and social realities of
the affected people and their situation. Too often, emergen-
cies serve as a testing ground in which well-intentioned
psychologists, including those who have little or no field
experience, ply their latest tools, most of which have not
been validated in the local context.
The likelihood of causing harm owes much to myriad
factors such as the competitive structure of the humanitar-
ian enterprise, uncertainties about its fundamental goals
and orientation,7 the power differential between outside
agencies and local people,8 the complexities of local culture
and politics9 not to mention the complexities of humani-
tarian politics,10 and the lack of appropriate training for
international psychosocial workers. Also, most profes-
sional codes of ethics and institutional review boards, nei-
ther of which were designed with large-scale emergencies
and diverse cultures and situations in mind, offer scant
guidance or oversight. For most humanitarian workers, the
author included, the pressures of an emergency overwhelm
the propensity for self-reflection. The  sad irony is that
without critical self-reflection, one is unlikely either to see
the inadvertent harm one causes or to take the steps needed
to correct and prevent harm.
This paper aims to identify some of the main ways in
which psychosocial interventions cause harm and to offer
concrete suggestions regarding how to prevent harm. It
seeks to avoid denigrating the field of psychosocial support
or paralyzing workers by suggesting that psychosocial pro-
grams inevitably do more harm than good. Rather, its goal
is to offer constructive criticism that strengthens psychoso-
cial work by helping to prevent unnecessary harm. My core
assumption, derived largely from field experience, is that
much harm can be prevented through a mixture of critical
self-awareness and action. With this in mind, I will examine
seven key issues, which are not exhaustive but which arise
repeatedly and warrant immediate attention. For purposes
of simplicity, each issue will be examined separately,
though in practice some of the greatest harm occurs
through their interaction. For each issue, I will identify
practical steps that mitigate and prevent harm.
Coordination
It is axiomatic that large-scale emergencies present needs
that are too great to be met by any single agency and that
inter-agency collaboration and coordination are neces-
sary.11 Accordingly, UN agencies or satellite agencies organ-
ize coordination groups to enable effective collaboration,
protect human  rights,  and achieve  appropriate levels of
quality and coverage in the humanitarian response.
Nevertheless, poor coordination continues to be the
Achilles heel of nearly every emergency operation. Coordi-
nation problems arise largely  from the structure of the
humanitarian enterprise, in which agencies compete for the
same limited funds and often seek to gain comparative
advantage by not sharing information and not relinquish-
ing their advantage through collaboration. That poor coor-
dination causes harm is evident is the waste of scarce
resources due to duplications of effort, the failures to share
information and to learn from each other, the uneven
coverage of geographic areas having significant humanitar-
ian need, and failure to deliver comprehensive support.
Psychosocial workers contribute to these issues in myr-
iad ways. In Timor Leste (former East Timor) following the
1999 attack of the Indonesian paramilitiaries, many agen-
cies conducted psychosocial work to support the popula-
tion that had suffered mass displacement and destruction
Do No Harm
7
of homes and infrastructure. However, most humanitarian
agencies stayed close to the capital city, Dili, where they had
ready  access to large numbers of people. The apparent
motivations were to look good to donors by serving large
numbers of people and to stay close to where the key
resource allocation decisions were made rather than go to
remote, rural areas that had enormous but unmet needs.
Unfortunately, this tendency to maintain a prominent po-
sition in the centres of power limited geographic coverage
and undermined the strategic allocation of resources that is
at the heart of effective coordination. A similar pattern
wherein agencies cluster near the capital is visible in most
emergencies.
Significant coordination problems are also evident in
failures to provide the diverse kinds of support needed to
assist affected people. Most psychologists and psychiatrists
accept the idea that in an emergency, supports should be
organized according to the familiar intervention pyramid.12
At the top of the pyramid is a minority of people, typically
around 10 per cent, who are severely affected or who had
pre-existing problems such as chronic mental illness and
who need specialized supports such as psychiatric care. The
middle layer of the pyramid is a larger group, usually
around 40 per cent of the population, who are at risk due
to issues such as gender-based violence, separation from
families, recruitment by armed groups, stigmatization and
isolation, and exploitation through dangerous labour.
These at-risk people, who often include the elderly, women,
children, and people with disabilities, often benefit from
focused psychosocial supports that trained paraprofession-
als implement at the community level. The largest
group—the 50 per cent at the base of the pyramid—typi-
cally requires no specialized or focused support and will
function well and without severe distress through the pro-
vision of appropriate education, health, shelter, livelihood,
and other basic supports. Within this framework, effective
coordination requires the establishment of supports at each
level of the pyramid and of appropriate referral mecha-
nisms.
In reality, however, it is the exception rather than the
norm to observe in emergencies proportionate supports at
all three levels. In most emergencies in resource-poor coun-
tries, the most severely affected people have few supports.
In emergencies in places such as Angola and Chad, it is not
uncommon to see people who are chronically mentally ill
tied to trees or other objects to prevent them from wander-
ing and encountering harm. In other emergencies, there is
a shortage of holistic, community-based supports to assist
people at the middle and bottom layers of the pyramid.
Even if proportionate supports exist, the division in the
field of psychosocial assistance into clinically oriented work
and more community oriented work may produce poor
coordination across the layers. In most emergencies, psy-
chiatrists working with the WHO and government health
agencies organize  clinical  services for the most severely
affected people. Typically, psychologists and social workers
who  are coordinated  by agencies  such as  UNICEF  and
UNHCR organize holistic community-based supports. In
Kosovo, this polarization resulted in the establishment of
two separate coordination groups, one under WHO and the
other under UNHCR. The existence of separate subgroups
is not problematic in itself, but it becomes an impediment
if there are no communications across the subgroups and
no cross-group referral mechanisms. Sadly, a visiting group
of US psychiatrists, psychologists, and social workers
learned that the two coordination groups neither collabo-
rated with each other nor knew of each other’s existence.
At present, this polarization of the field of psychosocial
assistance poses significant challenges to the nascent Clus-
ters system, in which the Health Cluster and the Protection
Cluster share the coordination responsibilities for mental
health and psychosocial support, working whenever possi-
ble with government partners. For example, soon after the
2006 earthquake in Yogyakarta, Indonesia, WHO, which
plays a lead role in the Health Cluster, and the Indonesian
Ministry of Health established a mental health coordina-
tion group. Independently, UNICEF, which plays a lead
role in the Protection Cluster, established a child protection
coordination group that included agencies conducting
community-based  psychosocial work. The  problem was
that initially the two groups did not attempt to coordinate.
Although this situation was subsequently corrected, this
example shows how the divisions in the field that antedated
the Clusters approach can mitigate the effectiveness of the
Clusters system. To address this problem, the new IASC
Guidelines calls explicitly for the establishment of a single,
overarching coordination structure. Psychosocial workers,
too, can help to address the problem of poor coordination
by doing their share to coordinate their work with others,
participating in local coordination groups, and encourag-
ing collaboration across different levels of the intervention
pyramid.
Dependency
Two key parts of the foundation of humanitarian work are
local empowerment and the restoration of dignity.13 Active
engagement in planning and action to build a better life is
widely regarded as one of the best antidotes to the feelings
of helplessness and being overwhelmed that are prevalent in
emergencies and camps for displaced people. Also, people’s
sense of dignity, which is diminished by war, losses, and
status changes associated with emergencies, increases mark-
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edly as local people regain a sense of control and take active
steps toward improving their lives. Whereas having a sense
of agency bestows dignity and hope, feelings of dependency
trample dignity and invite passivity and despair. Most com-
munity-based psychosocial programs aspire to mobilize and
empower communities by activating local networks, en-
couraging participation, and building on the capacities that
local people have.14 This empowerment-oriented approach
emphasizes community resilience and avoids regarding lo-
cal people as passive victims.
It is  an  understatement to  say  that many emergency
psychosocial responses fall short of this ideal. Following the
December 2004 tsunami, for example, a door-to-door sur-
vey in a village of fifty families in northern Sri Lanka
indicated that there were twenty-seven different NGOs
there “providing help.” According to one local resident,
“We  never  had  leaders here. Most  people are relatives.
When someone faced a problem, neighbours came to help.
But now some people act as if they are leaders, to negotiate
donations. Relatives do not help each other any more.”15
This example illustrates the harm that occurs when the
emphasis is on providing external supports rather than on
building on the resources and supportive practices that
already existed. Done badly, humanitarian aid undermines
local supports at the very moment they need to be strength-
ened.
One of the most common pathways into dependency is
tokenistic participation. Participation, which is a core hu-
man right, is authentic when local people have ownership
over programs, take part in key decisions, and guide pro-
gram design, implementation, evaluation, and refinement.
In the heat of emergencies, however, participation is often
relegated to the sidelines due to the emphasis on saving lives
by providing emergency services. Often, NGOs create these
services with little consultation with government actors or
community leaders and members. For example, expatriate
psychiatrists often provide services via international NGOs
that create what amounts to a parallel system to that of the
government for caring for severely affected people. Sadly,
these parallel systems tend to collapse when the emergency
funding dries up. With local people dependent on outside
services that are unsustainable, the withdrawal of the serv-
ices leaves needy people unsupported and quite possibly
worse off than they might have been otherwise. As col-
leagues in Sri Lanka put it, the greatest shock of the tsunami
was the influx of external actors who showed greater inter-
est in garnering large grants than in building local capacities
and partnering at a deep level with local communities and
government actors. Cynically, they called this phenomenon
the “golden tsunami,” an epithet that ought to awaken all
humanitarians to their responsibilities.
To avoid these problems, psychosocial workers should
put capacity building, empowerment, and community mo-
bilization at the heart of their program approach. Although
in emergencies one sometimes hears agencies excuse them-
selves by saying “There was no time for a fully participatory
approach,” it is time to recognize that a participatory ap-
proach is both essential and feasible in most contexts.
Aid as a Political Tool
Humanitarian ethics require close adherence to the princi-
ple of impartiality, which calls for humanitarian workers
and agencies to deliver aid where it is needed,  without
prejudice to particular political, military, ethnic, gender,
class, or religious orientations. Also, there is widespread
attention to the principle of independence, which requires
humanitarian agencies not to take sides in a conflict and to
avoid making humanitarian aid an extension of military
operations.
These principles, however, are easier to state than to obey
in practice. In every affected group of people, there are
discernible subgroups that vie for power and influence. Not
uncommonly, local people appropriate aid to the benefit of
some groups over others, even using it to continue the
fighting that  had caused  mass displacement in the first
place.16 Following the 1994 Rwandan genocide, for exam-
ple, Hutu genocidaires used food and other aid to purchase
weapons and cement their own power, while denying food
to their enemies.17 A less horrific but equally objectionable
case occurred in Tamil Nadu, India, where, following the
tsunami, the Indian government and international agencies
provided aid according to caste, as the “untouchables”
received little aid and were denied their basic rights. In such
cases, the way aid is delivered undermines people’s psy-
chosocial well-being.
It is important for psychosocial workers to avoid reified
images of “community” which are hopelessly simplistic. All
aid, including psychosocial support, enters a conflict sys-
tem where it is appropriated and used by different groups
having different agendas. Considerable on-the-ground ex-
perience and understanding of the local culture and situ-
ation are needed to map the local power structure, discern
different subgroups, and build a nondiscriminatory process
that includes all groups, including invisibles such as the
poorest of the poor and people with disabilities. For this
reason alone, it is ill-advised for psychosocial workers who
have no international emergency experience and little un-
derstanding of the local culture and situation to enter a
disaster zone with the idea that “we just wanted to help and
had to do something.” If this type of approach is a recipe
for coordination problems, it is equally a problem for the
development of politically and culturally sensitive pro-
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grams. For these and other reasons, some professional psy-
chology organizations discourage or prohibit their mem-
bers from flooding into international disaster zones
without  affiliation with  an appropriate  aid structure  or
organization, relevant cultural competencies, and experi-
ence working in armed conflicts or natural disasters, which-
ever is appropriate in the situation.
Recent trends toward the politicization of aid and inte-
grated military-humanitarian operations challenge the
principles of independence and impartiality.18 In fact, the
US government has announced that its humanitarian assis-
tance is an arm of its foreign policy, which is far from
impartial, and USAID now sits under the US State Depart-
ment. In countries such as Afghanistan, aid is increasingly
funded through provincial reconstruction teams. The ac-
tivities of these civil-military units blur the boundaries
between military and humanitarian operations, shrink the
humanitarian space, and reduce local people’s trust of hu-
manitarian workers. Lost trust is a profound issue for psy-
chosocial workers since feelings of trust and security are
essential for healing and other key psychosocial tasks. For
this reason, psychosocial workers need to think carefully
about whether and how to position themselves relative to
military operations. These decisions go beyond the tradi-
tional questions such as whether it is appropriate to hire
armed guards, which can support the militarization that
fuels armed conflicts. Most psychology curriculi offer little
if any training on how to engage with these complex hu-
manitarian ethical dilemmas.
Assessment Issues
An essential first step in addressing humanitarian needs is
to conduct a careful situation assessment that examines not
only the local needs but also the resources and assets of the
affected group. For most humanitarian workers and agen-
cies, assessments are means of collecting the data needed to
guide effective programming and to inform proposals to
donors. Unfortunately, the assessment process often raises
local people’s expectations that they will soon receive aid,19
but delays of several months between the assessment and the
start of the program commonly occur and frustrate local
people who have urgent needs. As a cynical Kosovar elder
said to me, “They [the NGOs] came with their fancy cars and
their writing tablets and asked many questions. But what
have they actually done?” This frustration is amplified by the
poor coordination that enables duplicate assessments, as-
sessment fatigue, and ongoing inaction.
Furthermore, most assessments include little real partici-
pation by local people, who are relegated to roles such as
“beneficiaries” and “respondents” to prepackaged ques-
tions rather than partners in taking stock of the situation
and designing supports. Too often, assessments begin a
process that quietly diminishes local people’s agency at the
moment when they most need to reassert control over their
situation. Not a small side effect is the lost opportunity to
learn about the culturally constructed understandings local
people have about the emergency and its aftermath. As
discussed below, this inattention to local cultural under-
standings serves to marginalize the local culture and mean-
ings that themselves provide psychosocial support.
To avoid these problems, psychosocial workers should
make participatory rapid assessments coupled with a
rapid response that provides the tangible evidence of sup-
port that local people need to see. By continuing the
assessment as the rapid response occurs, one circumvents
the limitations of rapid assessments while avoiding long
delays in response.
Short-term Assistance
In most emergencies, there is an influx of outside psycholo-
gists who, in the eyes of local people, seem to “parachute in,
stay a short time, and leave.” Short visits are valuable when
they support and build the capacity of local teams and are in
the context of an organization having a durable presence.
However, this tidy picture often bears little resemblance to
what actually happens. In Angola during its war of nearly
forty years, some psychosocial workers flew in and spent a
week or two conducting discussions intended to begin a
process of support, expression, and healing. When they left,
there was no one and no organization to follow up on the
discussions, which had raised difficult issues and left some
people feeling vulnerable. In such situations, the psychoso-
cial interventions probably caused more harm than good
and were ethically dubious at best.
A better role for outside psychologists is to build the
capacity of local people and groups, leaving direct interven-
tion to local people.20 Here, too, short-term efforts are best
regarded with caution. For example, in many emergencies,
NGOs and governments train cadres of local people to be
counsellors. Not uncommonly, the trainings last only sev-
eral weeks, and subsequent clinical supervision and support
is an afterthought. The risk is that people having serious
problems, including suicidal inclinations, may be in the
care of people who are poorly equipped to support them
and who may unintentionally cause harm. Because signifi-
cant amounts of time are required to build capacities for
psychosocial support, long-term efforts are indicated.
The need for long-term approaches stands in stark con-
trast with most donors’ short funding cycles, which typi-
cally run only a year. In this respect, doing or supporting
advocacy for long-term assistance is an essential part of
responsible psychosocial work in emergencies.
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Imposition of Outside Approaches
The structure of the humanitarian industry creates enor-
mous potential for quiet abuses of power that are evident in
neo-colonialist practices by NGOs and other outside agen-
cies.21 In many emergencies, NGOs rely on experts who use
Western theory and practice, believe that their concepts and
tools are universal and reflect good science, and analyze and
offer possible solutions to the problem. In the process, local
people take a secondary position and are made dependent
on the outside experts, thereby sending a highly disempow-
ering message that local people are unable to address local
problems. In places such as sub-Saharan Africa, this message
reinforces internalized beliefs about the inferiority of local
people that centuries of colonialism had promulgated.
The problems inherent in this approach, however, ex-
tend well beyond issues of dependency and felt inferiority.
In many emergencies, large numbers of psychologists arrive
and set about measuring trauma prevalence, following the
assumption that significant numbers of survivors will suffer
clinical issues such as Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD). The tendency of psychosocial workers to rush in
with a singular trauma focus itself has a number of harmful
effects. Too often, the focus on trauma narrows the devel-
opment  of comprehensive services  for people who face
mental health issues, including chronic mental illnesses and
neurological disorders that had antedated the emergency.
Quite often, the emphasis on trauma stigmatizes local peo-
ple by using labels regarded locally as denigrating and by
portraying normal reactions to life-threatening experiences
as a form of pathology.22 Also, the power dynamics of the
situation encourage the imposition of outsider concepts
and tools that do not fit the local culture and that silence
local people’s own understandings about mental health and
psychosocial well-being. Each culture has its own categories
of life and death, illness and health through which people
construct their understandings of their situation and what
is required for recovery and well-being. The importance of
culture is a prominent feature of many frameworks of
psychosocial support.23 When outside experts arrive, how-
ever, carrying predefined questionnaires and looking
mainly for what their Western theories predict, they typi-
cally fail to ask about the aspects of experience or practices
that local people regard as most important.
To illustrate, a team of Angolan social workers in Chris-
tian Children’s Fund (CCF)/Angola worked to reduce
trauma following the 1994 Lusaka Protocol that brought a
temporary breathing space in the Angolan wars. Having
been trained by Western psychologists, they measured
prevalence of trauma symptoms and changes in prevalence
as a result of a community-based program of nonformal
education, which included expressive activities such as
song, dance, and story-telling. They were quite convinced
that trauma was the problem and a Westernized process of
emotional expression and “working through” was the rem-
edy. This tidy picture was challenged by the story of a young
girl who said her village had been attacked and her parents
killed, causing her to flee for her life. But her biggest self-
reported stress was her failure to have conducted the locally
appropriate burial rituals. Questioned about this, she ex-
plained to a university-educated, relatively colonialized
staff that where she lived, people believed that the conduct
of the burial rituals is necessary for the dead people’s spirits
to transition to the realm of the ancestors. Without the
rituals, the spirits would be trapped and upset, leading them
to cause problems of bad health and misfortune for family
and community. In stark contrast to Western psychological
theories, which are cultural products that embody Enlight-
enment values such as individualism, she viewed herself as
having a spiritual affliction that was communal rather than
individual. She said she needed to talk with a healer who
knew how to help her conduct the appropriate burial ritual.
Fortunately, the CCF/Angola team took her advice, and the
conduct of the burial ritual helped her significantly. The
team subsequently reoriented its program to include eth-
nographic research and a combination of Western and local
resources for purposes of healing.
Unfortunately, this scenario of learning from local peo-
ple, which ought to be the norm, is an exception in most
emergencies. Outside experts and agencies wield so much
power in emergencies that they readily impose their own
views without challenge. Making matters worse, local peo-
ple often silence themselves or willingly embrace the idea
that “we are traumatized” because it seems to be their best
hope of obtaining outside assistance. The quiet marginali-
zation of local culture undermines or devalues local re-
sources that could have been built upon and that ordinarily
provide a source of meaning and continuity.24 In this man-
ner, outsiders privilege their own approaches while eroding
or side-stepping valuable local sources of psychosocial sup-
port.
The best antidote to these problems of cultural imperi-
alism is to learn as much as possible about the local cultural
beliefs and practices before initiating even an assessment.25
Quite often, local healers, elders, and religious and civic
leaders are helpful cultural informants who can provide
valuable insights into local culture. In beginning assess-
ment and other phases of the program cycle, it is valuable
to work through local people who have a thorough under-
standing of the situation and culture. The focus should be
less on outsiders’ preconceptions than on local people’s
understandings  and  resources  for psychosocial support.
Also, it is useful to reframe one’s role from that of outside
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expert, trainer, or program designer to that of facilitator in
which one works in partnership with local people, learning
together with them. Often, this approach leads to a con-
structive blending of local and outsider approaches that
avoids sidelining local practices. Throughout, it is crucial
for psychosocial workers to reflect critically on the power
dynamics of the situation and what they have done or ought
to do to respect and valorize local culture. Because some
local practices are harmful, a key part of maintaining a
critical perspective is to avoid the romanticization of local
culture and to use international human rights standards as
benchmarks for deciding which local practices are unsup-
portable.
Protection Issues
Protection is a profound issue for internally displaced peo-
ple, many of whom live in very dangerous situations but do
not enjoy the same standard of international protections
extended to refugees. For example, the risks of child recruit-
ment increase in situations of mass displacement. Although
discussions of protection frequently focus on physical safety,
protection also has to do with reducing emotional, social,
and spiritual threats to well-being. Five key protection issues
merit attention here.
First are breaches of confidentiality, which can increase
physical and psychosocial vulnerability. Imagine, for exam-
ple, a psychosocial worker interviewing a girl formerly
associated with an armed group in order to learn how to
most effectively support her reintegration. The interview,
however, ignites much discussion in the village, and word
spreads to a neighbouring village. Soon thereafter, the girl
is reabducted by the armed group. This example, which
resonates with actual events in the field, illustrates the
difficulties of maintaining confidentiality in a small village
in which life is highly collectivistic, norms of Western pri-
vacy and confidentiality are weak, and the arrival of an
outsider is a major event. To prevent such problems, it is
vital to exercise high levels of sensitivity and to learn from
key local informants such as elder women what steps can
be taken to protect confidentiality.
Second are issues of informed consent. Before interview-
ing war-affected people, most psychosocial workers seek to
obtain their informed consent by explaining their purpose,
asking their written permission  to talk with them,  and
explaining their right to refuse the interview, to not answer
particular questions, or to end the interview at any time.
The idea of written permission is often problematic if most
people are illiterate, though the use of thumbprints or
related methods may be suitable substitutes. However, the
deeper question is whether local people really feel free to
say “No.” People in collectivist societies view the group
good as trumping the individual good, and this may lead
them to do things that cause individual discomfort or harm.
In  desperate  circumstances,  the power dynamics of the
situation strongly mitigate against saying “No” because the
villagers see the interviewer as a source of cash and badly
needed assistance. To refuse an interview might not only
violate cultural norms of hospitality but also be perceived
as harming one’s family and village. As a result a person
who is highly vulnerable might agree to participate in an
interview when she is ill equipped to cope with the difficult
feelings it may evoke. Although there is no easy remedy for
this problem, useful steps are to discuss power issues di-
rectly and to seek guidance on how to handle the issues
from local leaders and local groups working on social pro-
tection issues.
Third, interviews and psychosocial interventions may
cause harm by asking intrusive questions that trigger hor-
rific memories or by probing sensitive issues at a moment
when the participants feel quite vulnerable.26 In Afghani-
stan, I encountered a young humanitarian worker who had
limited psychosocial training but had learned that healing
occurs through emotional expression. Each day he gathered
groups of children and asked them to draw a picture of the
worst thing that had happened to them during the war.
Unfortunately, he had not learned the other side of that
view, namely, that the expression needs to be coupled with
safety and appropriate processing or “working through”
under guidance by a trained psychologist or social worker
and backed by careful supervision. Nor had he taken into
account that serious psychological issues might not arise
immediately but might surface one or several days later.
Making matters even worse, he had made no provisions for
follow-up support. Such ill constructed psychosocial work
is likely to do more harm than good and constitutes a
significant protection threat. To prevent such harm, it is
useful to avoid aggressive questioning; to provide appropri-
ate psychosocial support during and following interviews;
to work with local helpers to identify who is not in a good
position to participate in potentially troubling discussions;
and to ensure that potentially invasive methods receive peer
review by local protection experts and are backed by appro-
priate supervision.
Fourth is the problem of excessive targeting of at-risk
groups. In many situations, psychosocial workers attempt
to support at-risk people, such as children formerly associ-
ated with armed groups, by engaging them in community-
based programs that intermix elements such as community
mobilization, family reintegration, health, education, and
livelihoods. A major priority is to reduce the stigma often
attached to being a former child soldier, many of whom had
belonged to groups that had attacked the villages they hope
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to return to in the post-conflict environment. Although
such holistic approaches have discernible benefits to the
former child soldiers, they may also trigger jealousies and
create reverse stigmatization. In countries such as Sierra
Leone, villagers often asked, “Why are these people who
had attacked us getting all this attention and wearing better
clothes than everyone else in the village?” In Liberia, villag-
ers often referred to the material benefits extended to for-
mer child soldiers but not to others as “blood money,” a
tacit reward for what they had done. Fortunately, such
problems can be avoided through the use of integrated
programs that offer support not only to a group such as
former child soldiers but also to other children who are at
risk due to issues such as separation, disability, forced early
marriage, dangerous labour, and HIV/AIDS, among many
others.27
Fifth is the lack of connection between work on healing
and nonviolent handling of conflict, which ought to go
hand in hand. In Kosovo, following the Serb onslaught, the
mass displacement of Kosovar Albanians, and the return
home, much psychosocial work conducted in a trauma-
healing idiom entailed having groups of Kosovar Albanians
tell their stories, expressing and “working through” their
pain. Often, this work had no connection with nonviolent
conflict management or resolution. Numerous participants
in such group discussions said that as Kosovars told their
horrific stories, people felt anger and desire for revenge
since it was apparent who had caused their victimization
and suffering. Some participants said they knew of people
who had left the discussions in a rage and attacked Serbs,
thereby increasing protection threats to the now minority
group and deepening the social divisions that had fuelled
much of the violence. To avoid such scenarios, it is vital to
link expressive work on healing with work on nonviolent
handling of inter-group conflict and on the social injustices
in which armed conflict is rooted.
Conclusion
There are countless other ways in which psychosocial work-
ers unintentionally cause harm. Harm sometimes occurs not
through inappropriate psychosocial practices but through
one’s personal dress and demeanour. In Afghanistan, for
example, female expatriates will give offense if they wear the
sleeveless blouses and shorts that are appropriate everyday
dress in places such as Europe and North America. Harm
may result from the very structure of a large-scale humani-
tarian intervention. In Afghanistan, following the defeat of
the Taliban in 2001, the influx of humanitarian workers
from predominantly Christian countries fuelled local per-
ceptions that the humanitarian effort was part of an organ-
ized effort to Christianize a fervently Muslim society. The
fact that even one’s presence, dress, and demeanour in a war
zone may cause harm serves as a poignant reminder of the
overarching importance of issues such as culture and relig-
ion in the current global context.
These and other issues warrant much greater attention
to the “Do No Harm” imperative in the field of psychosocial
assistance. Although some useful steps and guidelines are
offered by the nascent global guidance referred to earlier,
the problems are systemic and require concerted awareness
and action  at  multiple levels and among a  diversity of
actors. New kinds of training and preparation are needed
to provide the next generation of humanitarian workers
with the ethical awareness, cultural competencies, under-
standing of historical and social forces, and technical skills
they will need to respond to emergencies in a productive,
appropriate manner. This new training cannot be achieved
in academic institutions alone since actual field experience
is often the best source of learning on these issues. Profes-
sional organizations and humanitarian agencies also need
to provide better guidance and oversight. All agencies need
to strengthen the evidence base regarding effective practice,
simultaneously encouraging the use of effective practices
and preventing the use of practices that are harmful and
violate human rights. Above all, there need to be stronger
norms of self-reflection and critical thinking among hu-
manitarian workers. Collectively, these and related steps
may enrich and transform the field of psychosocial assis-
tance, enabling it to achieve its full potential and to provide
the most effective support to war- and disaster-affected
people in their hour of greatest need.
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